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Abstract
In this paper, we incorporate a price search decision into a life cy-
cle model and differentiate consumption from expenditure. Consumers
with low wealth and bad income shocks search more for cheaper prices
and pay less, which makes their consumption higher than in a model
without search option. A plausibly calibrated version of our model pre-
dicts that the cross-sectional variance of consumption is about 17%
smaller than the cross-sectional variance of expenditure throughout
the life cycle. Price search has an alternative productive activity role
for lower-income people to increase their consumption levels. We dis-
cuss other implications of price search over the life cycle as well.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the role of price search in the age-inequality pro-
files of consumption and expenditure. We incorporate a price search decision
into a quantitative life-cycle model and differentiate consumption from ex-
penditure. A plausibly calibrated version of the model predicts a significant
difference (about 17%) in age-inequality profiles of consumption and expen-
diture throughout the life cycle.
Our model economy features an incomplete markets framework. In gen-
eral, the models with incomplete markets ignore the partial insurance role
of price search and dispersion in prices.1 However the empirical literature
has documented significant dispersion in prices paid for identical goods.2 For
instance, Aguiar and Hurst (2007) document that, in the U.S. data, richer
people pay higher prices for identical goods. Also, they report that prices paid
for identical goods change over the life cycle, which is a result of a change
in price search due to a change in the cost of time. Using the U.S. data,
Sorensen (2000) documents dispersion in prices paid for the same medicine.
Dahlbay and West (1986) report price dispersion in automobile insurance
companies in Canadian data. Pratt et al. (1979) document price dispersion
in several categories of goods. Baye et al. (2004) document dispersion in
prices for identical goods posted in the internet. These documented facts
1See Heathcote et al. (2009)for a detailed survey on the partial insurance mechanisms
in incomplete markets.
2Baye et al. (2006) provide a detailed survey on the dispersion in prices paid for
identical goods.
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motivate a quantitative study on the role of price search over the life cycle.
Motivated by the reported facts on the dispersion in prices in the empirical
literature, this paper focuses on the partial insurance role of price search
in the age-inequality profiles of consumption and expenditure. We believe
that filling this gap in the literature is important to understand consumption
inequality over the life cycle.
We solve a life-cycle model, in which we allow agents to search for cheaper
prices in addition to the consumption/saving decision. As a result of idiosyn-
cratic income shocks, people are ex-post heterogeneous in terms of their
income realizations and wealth accumulations. If agents search more for
cheaper prices, they pay less and consume more; however, they enjoy less
leisure due to time constraints. Optimality implies that the marginal return
to and the marginal cost of price search are equalized. The marginal re-
turn to price search comes from additional consumption, and it is smaller for
individuals who already have high consumption. That implies that agents
with low wealth and bad income shocks search more and pay less, which we
interpret as partial insurance through price search. Our results show that
the cross-sectional variance of consumption is roughly 17% smaller than the
cross-sectional variance of expenditure throughout the life cycle.
Among many other studies in the quantitative life-cycle literature, this
paper is closely related to Guvenen (2007), Storesletten et al. (2004), and
Karahan and Ozkan (2010). Those papers study the role of income processes
on the age-inequality profile of consumption. Kaplan (2010) extends a similar
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model with unemployment risk to better match age-inequality profiles of
consumption and labor allocations over the life cycle. There is a common
implicit assumption in those models that says the price of a consumption
good is unique, and therefore consumption is equal to expenditure. However,
as we mentioned above, there is a large empirical literature that rejects this
assumption. Our paper differs from the standard life-cycle studies in the
sense that it differentiates consumption from expenditure. We show that
this distinction plays a quantitatively significant role in the age-inequality of
consumption.
The paper continues as follows. In section 2, we document some impor-
tant features of the data. We explain the model in section 3 and give the
details of the calibration in section 4. In section 5, we report the results, and
in section 6 we conclude.
2 Model
We extend a standard incomplete markets model with a price search technol-
ogy, which allows individuals to search for cheaper prices and partially insure
against bad income shocks. We do it in a life-cycle framework to study the
age-inequality profiles of consumption and expenditure. The environment is
incomplete due to uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. The population
consists of a continuum of individuals who work for T periods and afterwards
enjoy retirement until period T ∗. Each component of the model is explained
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in detail below.
2.1 Households
At each period, the individuals have two decisions: one is the consump-
tion/saving decision, and the other is the leisure/price search decision. The
individual can enjoy more consumption by searching for cheaper prices; how-
ever, he/she enjoys less leisure in that case. The individuals maximize life
time expected value of discounted utility:
E
T ∗∑
t=0
βtu(cit, l
i
t) (1)
where, u(·) is period utility, β is the time discount factor, cit and l
i
t are
consumption and leisure of individual i at time t.
Individual i has the following time constraint at period t:
sit + l
i
t + n
i
t = 1 (2)
where, sit and l
i
t are the time spent on price search and leisure for individual
i at period t. The variable nit denotes labor supply. It is a constant value, n¯,
during employment, and 0 after retirement.
There is an incomplete asset market, where individuals can borrow or save
through a risk-free interest-bearing asset. Individual i faces the following
budget constraint at time t:
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p(sit)c
i
t + a
i
t+1 = y
i
t + (1 + r)a
i
t (3)
where, p(·) is the price of a consumption good that depends on the individual
search time. Consumption and saving at the current period are denoted by
cit and a
i
t+1, respectively. Current period labor income is denoted with y
i
t,
and the labor income process will be explained in detail later on.
2.2 Price Search Technology
We follow Aguiar and Hurst (2007) in price function, because they estimated
the parameters of this form in the U.S. data, which we will calibrate accord-
ingly in the benchmark model. It is a log linear form:
log(p) = θ0 + θ log(s)
where θ is the return to search on prices. In the log linear form, doubling
search decreases prices by 100∗ θ percent. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) estimate
the return to search, θ, net of how much and what type of goods purchased
by the shopper. They use an AC Nielsen data set to estimate the parameters.
2.3 Earning and Pension Processes
For the earning process, we follow the literature. At each period, the individ-
ual is assumed to receive a persistent and a transitory income shock. This
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is a standard model for labor earnings and has been estimated in several
studies.3 The log earnings follow the following process:
log(yit) = β0 + β1t+ z
i
t + ǫ
i
t, with ǫ
i
t ∼ (0, σ
2
ǫ )
where β0 is a scale parameter, β1 is return to experience, t is the years of
experience , zit is the persistent income shock and ǫ
i
t is the transitory income
shock. The persistent income shocks follow an AR(1) process:
zit = ρz
i
t−1 + ν
i
t , with z0 = 0 and ν
i
t ∼ N(0, σ
2
ν)
We discuss the calibration of the earning process parameters in section 3.
For the pension process, we follow Guvenen (2007), which mimics the
U.S. Social Security system. After retirement, the pension of each agent
is determined by the ratio of his income in the last working period to the
average income in the last working period, yT
y¯T
. The pension function, Γ, (yT
y¯T
)
is as follows:
= γ ×


0.9yT
y¯T
, if yT
y¯T
< 0.3
0.27 + 0.32(yT
y¯T
− 0.3), if 0.3 < yT
y¯T
< 2
0.81 + 0.15(yT
y¯T
− 2), if 2 < yT
y¯T
< 4.1
1.1 if 4.1 < yT
y¯T
.
3For example: MaCurdy (1982), Storesletten (2004), Guvenen (2009).
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2.4 Utility Function
We use a utility function that is quite standard in the literature and is spec-
ified as follows:
u(ct, lt) =
c
(1−σ)
t
1− σ
+ φt log(lt).
The parameter φt affects the utility enjoyed from leisure time. It could also
be interpreted as the cost of the time the agent spends on price search.
2.5 Recursive Formulations
During the working periods, each individual solves the following optimization
problem:
V it (a
i
t, z
i
t, ǫ
i
t) = max
ci
t
,si
t
,ai
t+1
{u(cit, l
i
t) + δE[V
i
t+1(a
i
t+1, z
i
t+1, ǫ
i
t+1)|z
i
t, ǫ
i
t]}
s.t.
p(sit)c
i
t + a
i
t+1 = y
i
t + (1 + r)a
i
t
sit + l
i
t + n = 1
ait+1 ≥ Ψ
i
t
for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}
In the above problem, cit is consumption, s
i
t is the time used for price
search, lit is leisure, a
i
t is the asset level, a
i
t+1 is saving, and y
i
t is earnings
at period t. Agents can borrow up to a borrowing limit Ψit, which depends
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on his/her income realization one period before. The return on savings is
denoted with r, and the time discount factor with β. We have an exogenous
labor supply n, and the total available time is normalized to 1. Note that the
agent can enjoy the same amount of consumption with different expenditure
levels. The agent can spend more time to find cheaper prices which will allow
her to enjoy a certain amount of consumption with small expenditure levels.
After retirement, individuals receive a constant pension that depends on
the earnings in the last period of their working life. The individual’s problem
becomes deterministic due to the constant pension after retirement:
V it (a
i
t, y
i) = max
ci
t
,si
t
,ai
t+1
{u(cit, l
i
t) + δV
i
t+1(a
i
t+1, y
i)}
s.t.
p(sit)c
i
t + a
i
t+1 = y
i + (1 + r)ait
sit + l
i
t = 1
ait+1 ≥ Ψ
i
t
yi = Γ(yiT )
for t ∈ {T + 1, ..., T ∗} with V iT ∗+1 = 0
Each individual’s pension is determined by Γ(·) function. The time en-
dowment is looser for retired people, since they do not work. Note that the
constant labor supply n does not appear in their time constraint.
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3 Calibration
We calibrate the model in two stages. In the first stage, we directly use the
values of some parameters that are well established in the related literature.
This gives us the opportunity to understand the role of price search in the
standard life cycle models. We calibrate the time period yearly, and each
individual starts working at age 20 and retires at 65.4 Each individual starts
working life with the asset level set at 0. We set δ = 0.966 and r = 0.04,
which are standard for yearly calibrated models. The value of the relative
risk-aversion parameter, σ, is set to 2. We repeated the computation with
other values, too. The parameters of income process - β0, β1, ρ, σ
2
ε and
σ2v - are taken from Guvenen (2009), which provides one of the most recent
estimations of income processes.5
In the second stage, we calibrate parameters θ0, φt to match chosen mo-
ments in the data. Note that we allow φ to change over the life cycle. We
do that in order to match the empirical life cycle profile of average prices
paid. We target the log deviation of average prices from age 25 over the life
cycle. We normalize the average price paid in the whole population to 1 by
calibrating θ0. For a set of parameters we compute the policy functions and
simulate a population of N = 10000 individuals. We repeat this process until
4We assume high school graduates start working at age 18 and college graduates at age
22. We take the average of the two ages, because we don’t distinguish between education
levels in the model.
5Guvenen (2009) estimates two different types of income processes, namely Restricted
Income Process and Heterogeneous Income Process. We pick the first one, because it
matches our model’s empirical target (age-inequality profile of expenditures) well.
10
Table 1: Benchmark Model Parameters
Parameter Value
δ Time discount factor 0.966
r Interest rate 0.0416
σ Relative risk aversion 2
T Retirement age 65
T ∗ Death age 85
θ0 Scale parameter in prices 0.76
θ1 Return to price search -0.1
β1 Return to experience 0.009
ρ Persistence of income shocks 0.988
σ2ε Variance of transitory shock 0.061
σ2v Variance of noise 0.015
we match the chosen moments. The benchmark parameters are reported in
Table 1. Figure 1 compares the model-generated log deviation of average
prices to the data.
4 Results
4.1 Age-Inequality Profiles of Consumption and Ex-
penditure
In the earlier studies, consumption was assumed to be equal to expenditure,
which implied exactly equal age-inequality profiles for consumption and ex-
penditure. In this paper, we differentiate consumption from expenditure by
11
Figure 1: Life-cycle profile of Prices: Model vs Data
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Notes: Empirical estimations for the prices paid over the life cycle are taken from Aguiar
and Hurst (2007).
introducing price search into the model. Our model predicts a higher ex-
penditure inequality than consumption inequality throughout the life cycle.
The cross-sectional variance of log expenditure starts from 0.09 at age 25 and
increases up to 0.35 at age 65. However, the variance of log consumption is
about 0.07 at age 25 and it is about 0.27 at age 65. Figure 2 illustrates the
age-inequality profiles of consumption and expenditure.
In order to understand the gap between the consumption variance and the
expenditure variance throughout the life cycle, we decompose the expenditure
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Figure 2: Cross Sectional Variance: Consumption vs Expenditure
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variance:
e = p× c (4)
var(log e) = var(log c) + var(log p) + 2cov(log c, log p) (5)
We calculate each component of var(log e) from the model’s results. Through-
out the life cycle, the model predicts that around 17% of the variance in
log expenditure comes from the covariance between consumption and prices.
About 82% of the expenditure variance comes from consumption variance.
Figure 3 summarizes our findings.
We visit the optimality condition for price search to understand the pos-
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Cross Sectional Expenditure Variance
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−
u1(ct, lt)
p(s)
p′(st)ct = u2(ct, lt) (6)
Plugging the utility and price functions into equation 6, we get the following
equation, which gives the relationship between search and consumption:
c1−σt
st
θ1 =
φt
1− st
The first-order condition for price search implies a diminishing marginal re-
turn with consumption. Wealthier people who consume at high levels have
less incentive to increase their consumption by sacrificing leisure. Note that
the cost of price search is forgone utility from leisure. People with higher in-
come and wealth spend more time on non-search activities instead of search-
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Figure 4: Cross Sectional Variance of Log Search: Model
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ing prices to increase their consumption. People with lower income and
wealth spend more time on price search to increase their consumption levels.
Price search has a productive activity role for lower-income and lower-wealth
people to increase consumption levels.
4.2 Age-Inequality Profile of Search
Figure 4 shows the age-inequality profile of search over the life cycle. The
model predicts an increasing inequality profile for search.
The underlying reason for the increasing profiles of search is the idiosyn-
cratic income shocks over the life cycle. As people deviate from each other in
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terms of income and wealth over the life-cycle, they also deviate from each
other in terms of time spent searching for cheaper prices, and that leads to
an increasing dispersion in search and prices.
4.3 The Role of Risk Aversion
In this section, we study the effect of risk aversion on search behavior and
the age-inequality profiles of consumption and expenditure. Figure 5 shows
the cross-sectional variance of consumption and expenditure for risk aversion
parameter values of 2 and 3. As a result of the increase in risk-aversion,
the precautionary savings increase, which makes the age-inequality profile of
consumption flatter compared to the lower risk-aversion case. A flatter age-
inequality profile of consumption increases the gap between the age-inequality
profiles of consumption and expenditure. In particular, the gap between the
two series increases roughly from 17% to 30%, as illustrated in Figure 5.
On the other hand, an increase in risk aversion makes the age-inequality
profile of price search flatter. This is a result of a substitution between
the two insurance mechanisms. As individuals increase partial insurance
through precautionary savings, they decrease the partial insurance through
price search. For the same reason, the rate of increase for the average search
gets smaller when we increase the risk aversion. This can be seen in the
optimality condition with respect to price search in equation (6). Figures 6
and 7 illustrate the results.
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Figure 5: Effect of Risk Aversion: Consumption vs Expenditure
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Figure 6: Effect of Risk Aversion: Average Search
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Figure 7: Effect of Risk Aversion: Variance of Search
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4.4 The Role of Search Technology
We solve the model with two values of the parameter θ to determine its
role in the quantitative results. In the benchmark model, we use a value of
−0.1, which is the estimated value in Aguiar and Hurst (2007) for the U.S.
data. We also solve the model with a value of −0.2. This exercise shows
the implications of a technological innovation in price search, such as the
internet.
As illustrated in Figure 8, the gap between the age-inequality profiles of
consumption and expenditure increases as a result of an increase in price
search technology. The higher return to price search brings more partial in-
surance and the variance in consumption decreases. As the return to search
increases, the increase in the search time of the poor and low-income indi-
viduals is higher than the increase in the search time of the wealthy and
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Figure 8: Effect of Price Search Technology: Consumption vs Expenditure
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high-income individuals. As a consequence, the variance and the average
of search time increase with a higher return to search technology, which is
illustrated in Figures 9 and 10.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study the role of price search on the age-inequality pro-
files of consumption and expenditure. We introduce a price search deci-
sion into a life-cycle model, differentiate consumption from expenditure, and
study the joint behavior of shopping strategies, individual prices, and con-
sumption/saving decisions. The model predicts an increasing age-inequality
profile for search, prices, consumption, and expenditure. Our quantitative
study - using an estimated income process and price search functions from
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Figure 9: Effect of Search Technology: Average Search
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Figure 10: Effect of Search Technology: Variance of Search
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the literature - predicts that consumption inequality is significantly different
from expenditure inequality when agents can search for prices. A plausibly
calibrated version of our model predicts that the cross-sectional variance of
consumption is about 17% smaller than the cross-sectional variance of ex-
penditure throughout the life cycle. In the earlier studies,6, consumption
inequality was implicitly assumed to be the same as expenditure inequality.
Although we focused on age-inequality profiles, the model can be ex-
tended to further explain empirical observations. For instance, Aguiar and
Hurst (2009) document different patterns in different expenditure categories.
Price search could be helpful in explaining the different patterns because
some categories might be more sensitive to price search. The life-cycle
search profile may have different implications for the expenditure patterns
of different categories due to their different sensitivities. Carroll and Sum-
mers (1989) document different expenditure patterns for different education
groups. Again, price search together with income processes could be help-
ful to explain the expenditure patterns. Different price search technologies
or time cost profiles for different education or occupation groups could be
helpful in explaining the different expenditure patterns. In this paper we
used average cost of time (the coefficient of leisure in the utility function)
over the life cycle. It is likely that the variance of the opportunity cost of
time changes over the life cycle to varying degrees for different education
and occupation groups. Potentially it will have important implications on
6For example; Storesletten et al. (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006), Guvenen (2007).
21
inequality in general.
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